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I. FACTUAL FRAMEWORK.  
A. PARTIES. 
Organization of Disappearing Island Nations (ODIN), is 
a not-for-profit membership organization devoted to protecting the 
interests of island nations threatened by sea level rise. Apa Mana 
is an alien national of the island nation of A’Na Atu. Noah Flood is 
a U.S. citizen resident of the New Union Islands, a U.S. possession. 
Both individual plaintiffs are members of the organizational 
plaintiff, ODIN. Both A’Na Atu and the New Union Islands are 
located in the East Sea, and, according to the complaint, will be 
completely uninhabitable due to rising seas by the end of this 
century unless action is taken to limit emissions of greenhouse 
gases. 
 
HexonGlobal is the surviving corporation resulting from the 
merger of all of the major United States oil producers. It is 
incorporated in the State of New Jersey, and it has its principle 
place of business in Texas. Historically, the greenhouse gas 
emissions from products sold by HexonGlobal (and its corporate 
predecessors) are responsible for 32% of United States cumulative 
fossil fuel-related greenhouse gas emissions, or six percent of 
global historical emissions. Cumulative worldwide sales of fossil 
fuels by HexonGlobal constitute nine percent of global fossil fuel 
related emissions. 
 
United States is the alleged sovereign trustee of national 
natural resources, including air, water, sea, shores of the sea, and 
wildlife. In this sovereign capacity, the United States has control 
of our nation’s air space and atmosphere, public lands, waters, and 
other natural resources, including fossil fuel reserves. Also, in its 
sovereign capacity, the United States controls articles of interstate 
and international commerce, including extraction, development, 
and conditions for the utilization of fossil fuels and their 
byproducts. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
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B. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
Broadly, this case involves two claims: First, that 
HexonGlobal is in violation of the customary international law 
Trail Smelter Principle, which is enforceable as the Law of 
Nations, and as such triggers jurisdiction in federal district court 
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (ATS); Second, the 
United States is violation of the Public Trust Doctrine for failure 
to protect the global atmospheric climate system from disruption 
due to the production, sale, and burning of fossil fuels, and thus in 
violation of the Due Process Clause for depriving Flood of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law. The first four issues 
the parties have been ordered to brief are related to the first claim, 
the fifth issue is related to the second claim, and the sixth issue 
considers broadly whether these claims present a non-justiciable 
political question. 
 
Alien Tort Statute 
 
Plaintiff Mana, a national of the nation of A’na Atu, asserts a 
claim under the ATS. The ATS provides, simply, “The district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien 
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.” This statute provides only for 
jurisdiction in the District Court; it does not create a cause of 
action, which must be found in a treaty or the Law of Nations. Sosa 
v. Alvarez, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d 569 U.S. 108 
(2013). The Supreme Court has announced important limitations 
on the action contemplated by the ATS. 
First, the alleged violation of international law must be one 
that is universally accepted and understood to give rise to 
individual liability, as in cases of kidnapping or piracy. Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 731–32. In Sosa the petitioner argued that “there is no 
relief under the ATS because the statute does no more than vest 
federal courts with jurisdiction, neither creating nor authorizing 
the courts to recognize any particular right of action without 
further congressional action.” Id. at 712. However,”[t]he Sosa 
3
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Court . . . held that in certain narrow circumstances courts may 
recognize a common-law cause of action for claims based on the 
present-day law of nations, in addition to the historical paradigms 
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.” Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, ___ 
U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1398 (2018). The Sosa Court then 
developed a two-part test in order to determine an ATS common-
law action: 1) “whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged 
violation is of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.” Id. 
at 1390 (internal quotations omitted), and 2) “Assuming that such 
a norm can control, . . .whether allowing the case to proceed under 
the ATS is a proper exercise of judicial discretionFalse” Id. at 1390-
1391. 
Second, the activities alleged to give rise to the cause of action 
must have occurred principally within the jurisdiction of the 
United States; that is, the ATS does not create rules of 
extraterritorial application. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 
U.S. at 124. In Kiobel the Court recognized the canon of statutory 
interpretation known as the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, which provides “[w]hen a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none[.]” Id. at 
115 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 255 (2010)). The Court concluded that “the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and 
that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.” Id. at 124. 
And, finally, the defendant must not be a foreign corporation. 
Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407. Relying on the second question of the 
Sosa test, the Jesner Court ruled that “judicial deference requires 
that any imposition of corporate liability on foreign corporations 
for violations of international law must be determined in the first 
instance by the political branches of government.” Id. at 1408. With 
respect to the first question of the Sosa test, the Court did not make 
a determination on corporate liability. Whether or not an ATS 
claim can be brought against a domestic corporation is discussed 
below in Section III.A 
Mana claims that HexonGlobal’s fossil fuel production and 
sales activities violate the Trail Smelter principle, which holds that 
emissions into the environment within the territory of one nation 
must not be allowed to cause substantial harms in the territory of 
other nations. This principle is reflected in the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1965 (1941), in which an international 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
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arbitral panel held that harms to agriculture interests in the 
United States caused by air pollution emissions from a smelter in 
Canada were a violation of international liability principles. 
Whether the Trail Smelter Principle is a recognized principle of 
customary international law enforceable as the law of nations 
under the ATS is discussed below in Section III.B. Whether the 
Trail Smelter Principle is enforceable against non-governmental 
actors is discussed in Section III.C. 
The District Court did not reach determinations on the issues 
discussed above, because it found that any action Mana might have 
under the ATS has been displaced by greenhouse gas regulation 
under the Clean Air Act (CAA). The District Court reasoned that 
claims sounding in international tort must be considered claims 
arising under federal common law, and that the Supreme Court 
has already held that the Clean Air Act displaces the federal 
common law of air pollution. American Electric Power v. 
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). Other district courts hearing 
claims against oil producers have reached the same conclusion. See 
City of Oakland v. B.P., PLC, No. C17-06011 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 
2018); City of New York v. B.P., PLC, No. 18 Civ. 182 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 
19, 2018). Whether or not the Trail Smelter Principle is displaced 
by the CAA is discussed below in Section III.D. 
 
Due Process Protection for the Public Trust Doctrine 
 
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provides that no 
person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Among the protected life, 
liberty, and property rights are fundamental rights that are 
unenumerated by the Constitution. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973)(recognizing the unenumerated fundamental right to an 
abortion which was necessary to enable the exercise of another 
unenumerated fundamental right of privacy). The Ninth 
Amendment specifically allows for the recognition of 
unenumerated fundamental rights. U.S. Const. amend. IX (“The 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
Flood asserts that the failure of the United States government 
to take effective action to control greenhouse gas emissions, 
together with its historical support for fossil fuel production, 
5
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violates its obligations under the public trust doctrine, as 
incorporated by the Fifth Amendment substantive due process 
guarantee against government action that deprives persons of 
their rights to life, liberty, and property. In essence, Flood claims 
a fundamental due process right to a healthy and stable climate 
system, and seeks to support this right by relying on public trust 
principles. Since the fundamental right of “a healthy and stable 
climate system” is not enumerated in the Constitution, Flood also 
relies on the Ninth Amendment. 
The ancient Roman Code of Justinian declared “the following 
things are by natural law common to all - the air, running water, 
the sea, and consequently the seashore.” J. Inst. 2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle 
trans.). Public trust principles have been incorporated into U.S. 
law by way of the common law of Great Britain. Flood asserts 
public trust principles are secured by the Constitution as 
fundamental rights. Flood asserts that the global climate system 
is a common property owned in trust by the United States that 
must be protected and administered for the benefit of current and 
future generations. 
Flood’s claim is that the United States government failed to 
prevent harms caused by private parties – the production, sale, 
and combustion of fossil fuels in the U.S. market. The Supreme 
Court has specifically rejected any fundamental Due Process right 
to government protection from allegedly wrongful acts by private 
parties. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 196 (1989). Put another way, the “Due Process Clause does 
not impose on the government an affirmative obligation to act, 
even when ‘such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or 
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive 
the individual.’” Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1250 
(D. Or. 2016)(quoting DeShaney). 
Flood relies heavily on the Oregon District Court case Juliana 
v. United States, which recognized a Due Process-based public 
trust right to government protection from atmospheric climate 
change by applying the “danger creation” exception. Id. at 1251. 
The danger creation exception to DeShaney, applied by the Ninth 
Circuit, “permits a substantive due process claim when 
government conduct ‘places a person in peril in deliberate 
indifference to their safety.’” Id. (quoting Penila v. City of 
Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1997); See L. W. v. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
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Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992). The Juliana court 
clarified the exception by forming a three prong test: “A plaintiff 
asserting the danger-creation exception due process claim must 
show (1) the government’s acts created the danger to the plaintiff; 
(2) the government knew its acts caused the danger; and (3) the 
government with deliberate indifference failed to act to prevent the 
alleged harm.” Id. at 1252. 
The Parties here have been ordered to brief the question “Is 
there a cause of action against the United States Government, 
based on the Fifth Amendment substantive due process protections 
for life, liberty, and property, for failure to protect the global 
atmospheric climate system from disruption due to the production, 
sale, and burning of fossil fuels?” This question is discussed further 
in Section IV. 
 
Political Question 
 
A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide a 
political question: “Questions, in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can 
never be made in this court.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 
(1803). In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court 
provided six criteria which help to identify a political question. 
Unless the question presented by the case at bar is “inextricable” 
from any of the following criteria “there should be no dismissal for 
non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence[:]” 
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the 
issue to a coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [(4)] 
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution 
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [(5)] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a political decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.  
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Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The mere fact that a case 
presents the court with a politically charged issue does not make 
the case non-justiciable; political question doctrine “is one of 
‘political questions,’ not one of ‘political cases.’” Id. Whether either 
claim presents a non- justiciable political question is discussed in 
Section V below. 
 
List of Applicable Statutory and Constitutional Provisions: 
•  Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 
•  U.S. CONST., Amend. V 
•  U.S. CONST., Amend. IX 
 
List of International Law Principles: 
•  Principle 21 of the Declaration of the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment 
•  Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development 
C. SUMMARY OF FACTS. 
These following facts are pleaded in the complaint and will be 
taken as true for the purposes of review of a motion to dismiss. 
Carbon dioxide and methane are trace atmospheric gases, 
constituting less than one-half of one percent of the composition of 
the atmosphere. Both of these gases are known as “greenhouse 
gases.” Greenhouse gases cause an insulating effect which leads 
the Earth to retain heat. Earth’s climate depends on the balance 
between the amount of solar radiation that reaches the Earth and 
the amount of heat that is radiated from Earth back into space. 
Greenhouse gases in the atmosphere play an important regulating 
role in this balance: too little greenhouse gas would result in colder 
global temperatures as more heat is radiated into space, and too 
much greenhouse gas would result in higher global temperatures 
as more heat is reflected back to Earth. Human burning of fossil 
fuels for energy production has substantially increased the 
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Human 
production and distribution of fossil fuels, particularly natural gas, 
has also resulted in substantial increases in the concentration of 
methane in the atmosphere. These emissions, combined with 
emissions of greenhouse gases from agricultural and industrial 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
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activity, are causing a change in the global climate, resulting in 
increasing temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, and rising 
sea levels. If global emissions of greenhouse gases continue at 
current rates, global temperatures will rise by over four degrees 
Celsius compared to pre-industrial global temperatures, and 
average sea level will likely rise by between one-half and one meter 
by the end of this century. 
Both A’Na Atu and New Union Islands are low-lying islands 
with a maximum height above sea level of less than three meters. 
The populated areas of both islands are below one meter in 
elevation. Sea level rise of one-half meter to one meter would 
render both of these islands uninhabitable due to waves washing 
over the islands during storms. 
Both Apa Mana and Noah Flood own homes, and reside, in 
communities with an elevation of less than one-half meter above 
sea level. Both individual plaintiffs have suffered seawater damage 
to their homes during several storms over the past three years. 
Such damage would not have occurred in the absence of the 
greenhouse gas induced sea level rise. Both individuals have 
incurred, and will continue to incur, substantial expenses to repair 
past damage and prevent future damage to their homes due to sea 
level rise. 
Both individuals have experienced seawater intrusion into 
their drinking water wells. Increasing temperatures will also put 
individual plaintiffs’ health at risk by increasing their risk of heat 
stroke and mosquito borne diseases. Both plaintiffs rely on locally 
caught seafood as an important part of their diet, and climate 
change induced ocean acidification, warming, and loss of coastal 
wetlands will reduce ocean productivity and reduce the availability 
of this food source. Limits on fossil fuel production and combustion 
would reduce further damage to plaintiffs’ properties, reduce these 
health risks, and would maintain the habitability of plaintiffs’ 
communities. 
Defendant HexonGlobal is the surviving corporation resulting 
from the merger of all of the major United States oil producers. It 
is incorporated in the State of New Jersey, and it has its principle 
place of business in Texas. Historically, the greenhouse gas 
emissions from products sold by HexonGlobal (and its corporate 
predecessors) are responsible for 32% of United States cumulative 
fossil fuel-related greenhouse gas emissions, or 6% of global 
9
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historical emissions. Cumulative worldwide sales of fossil fuels by 
HexonGlobal constitute nine percent of global fossil fuel related 
emissions. 
The heat-retention properties of carbon dioxide and methane 
have been established as scientific fact since the nineteenth 
century. Emission of substantial amounts of carbon dioxide is the 
expected and inevitable result of the normal combustion of 
petroleum products as a fuel. Based on their own scientific 
research, HexonGlobal, and its corporate predecessors have been 
aware since the 1970s that continued global sales and combustion 
of fossil fuel products would result in substantial harmful global 
climate change and sea level rise. HexonGlobal persisted in these 
profitable business activities despite this knowledge. HexonGlobal 
operates refineries throughout the world, including one refinery 
located on New Union Island. As a condition to doing business on 
New Union Island, HexonGlobal has consented to general personal 
jurisdiction in all courts in the Territory of New Union Islands. 
The United States is, historically, the largest single national 
contributor to emissions of greenhouse gases. The United States 
has been responsible for 20% of cumulative global anthropogenic 
(human caused) greenhouse gas emissions to date. Until relatively 
recently, the government of the United States has not limited fossil 
fuel production, distribution, or combustion. Instead, the United 
States, through various agency policies and programs, has 
promoted the production and combustion of fossil fuels. These 
programs include tax subsidies for fossil fuel production, leasing of 
public lands and seas under its jurisdiction for coal, oil, and gas 
production, creation of the interstate highway system, and the 
development of fossil fuel power plants by public agencies such as 
the Tennessee Valley Authority. 
Nonetheless, in more recent decades, the United States has 
acknowledged the threat of climate change. In 1992, the United 
States signed, and the Senate ratified, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 
UNFCCC acknowledged the potential for dangerous anthropogenic 
climate change and stated an objective “to achieve . . . stabilization 
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
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climate system.”1 The UNFCCC also committed developed nation 
parties to “adopt national policies and take corresponding 
measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and 
enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”2 No legislation 
implementing this commitment has been adopted. 
During the past decade, the United States has taken several 
steps towards the regulation of domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions. In 2007, the United States Supreme Court held, in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, that greenhouse gases, including carbon 
dioxide, were “pollutants” that were potentially subject to 
regulation under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7521 (2018).3 Following this holding, in 2009, the United States 
Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) made a finding 
(the “Endangerment Finding”) that the emission of greenhouse 
gases and resulting climate change had the potential to endanger 
the public health and welfare, setting the regulatory predicate for 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.4 
In 2010, EPA, jointly with the National Highway Transportation 
Agency, adopted a rule establishing both fuel economy standards 
and greenhouse gas emissions rates for passenger cars and light 
trucks for model years 2012-2016,5 and these regulations were 
extended in 2012 to require increasingly stringent emissions 
limitations through model year 2025.6 Also in 2010, EPA issued a 
rule under the Clean Air Act requiring major new sources of 
greenhouse gases to undergo review to establish technology based 
limits on greenhouse gas emissions.7 In 2015, the EPA issued 
regulations establishing carbon dioxide emissions standards for 
new power plants,8 and requiring states to implement controls on 
 
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107, 169 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
2 UNFCCC, at 171. 
3 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
4 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
5 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) 
6 77 Fed. Reg. 62,623 (Oct. 15, 2012). 
7 5 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). Application of this rule was subsequently 
limited by the Supreme Court to those new air pollutant sources that were already 
subject to review for non-greenhouse gas emissions. Utility Air Regulatory Group 
v. EPA, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2427 (2014).  
8 80 Fed. Reg. 64510 (Oct. 23, 2015) 
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greenhouse gas emissions from existing power plants, the so-called 
“Clean Power Plan.”9 Also in 2015, the President of the United 
States signed the Paris Agreement, an international executive 
agreement that committed the United States and other nations to 
reduce their future greenhouse gas emissions by an amount to be 
determined independently by each 
II. ISSUES. 
• Can Mana bring an Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (ATS) claim against a domestic corporation? 
o On appeal, ODIN and the United States will 
argue Mana can bring an ATS claim against a 
domestic corporation. 
o On appeal HexonGlobal will argue that Mana 
cannot bring an ATS claim against a domestic 
corporation. 
• Is the Trail Smelter Principle a recognized principle of 
customary international law enforceable as the “Law of 
Nations” under the ATS? 
o On appeal, ODIN and the United States will 
argue the Trail Smelter Principle is customary 
international law enforceable as the “Law of 
Nations” under the ATS. 
o On appeal, HexonGlobal will argue the Trail 
Smelter Principle is not customary 
international law enforceable as the “Law of 
Nations” under the ATS. 
• Assuming the Trail Smelter Principle is customary 
international law, does it impose obligations 
enforceable against non-governmental actors? 
o On appeal, ODIN and the United States will 
argue that the Trail Smelter Principle does 
impose obligations enforceable against non-
governmental actors. 
o On appeal, and HexonGlobal will argue that 
the Trail Smelter Principle does not impose 
 
9  80 Fed. Reg. 64662, (Oct. 23, 2015).  
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obligations enforceable against non-
governmental actors. 
• If otherwise enforceable, is the Trail Smelter Principle 
displaced by the Clean Air Act? 
o On appeal, the United States and 
HexonGlobal will argue that the Clean Air 
Act displaces the Trail Smelter Principle. 
o On appeal, ODIN will argue that the Clean Air 
Act does not displace the Trail Smelter 
Principle 
• Is there a cause of action against the United States 
Government, based on the Fifth Amendment 
substantive due process protections for life, liberty, 
and property, for failure to protect the global 
atmospheric climate system from disruption due to 
the production, sale, and burning of fossil fuels?. 
o On appeal, ODIN will argue there is a Fifth 
Amendment substantive due process cause of 
action against the United States Government 
for failure to protect the global atmospheric 
climate system from disruption due to the 
production, sale, and burning of fossil fuels. 
o On appeal, the United States and 
HexonGlobal will argue there is not a Fifth 
Amendment substantive due process cause of 
action against the United States Government 
for failure to protect the global atmospheric 
climate system from disruption due to the 
production, sale, and burning of fossil fuels. 
• Do Plaintiffs’ law of nations claim under the Alien 
Tort Statute and public trust claim present a non-
justiciable political question? 
o On appeal, ODIN and HexonGlobal will 
argue the claims do not present a non- 
justiciable political question. 
o On appeal, the United States will argue the 
claims do present a non-justiciable political 
question. 
13
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III. ALIEN TORT STATUTE CLAIM: 
A. Can Mana bring an Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (ATS) claim against a domestic corporation? 
ODIN and the United States argue the Alien Tort Statute, 
28 U.S.C § 1350 (ATS) allows Apa Mana, an alien citizen of the 
nation A’Na Atu, to bring a claim against HexonGlobal, a 
domestic corporation. HexonGlobal argues the ATS does not 
allow Ms. Mana to bring a claim against a domestic corporation 
 
ODIN and the United States 
 
ODIN and the United States will argue that the plain 
language of the ATS does not exclude domestic corporations as 
defendants. The statute reads, “[t]he district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” While the statute does limit the class of plaintiffs 
to “alien[s]”, the text does not distinguish a particular class of 
defendants. ODIN and the United States will assert a domestic 
corporation in violation of the law of nations satisfies the plain 
language of the statute. 
ODIN and the United States may try to distinguish this case 
from the holding of Jesner. In Jesner the Court held that “foreign 
corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the 
ATS.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407. ODIN and the United States 
could argue first, that the mere fact that the Court specified 
“foreign corporations” are ineligible as defendants that domestic 
must be eligible; otherwise the Court would have simply held that 
all corporations are ineligible defendants. 
ODIN and the United States could also distinguish domestic 
corporations from foreign corporations by pointing to the reasoning 
behind the Jesner Court’s holding. The Jesner Court was keenly 
concerned with the possibility of a domestic corporation being 
hailed to a foreign court if the Court would allow foreign 
corporations to be hailed to our courts under the ATS. See id. at 
1405-06 (citing Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (2013)); See also Kiobel, 569 
U.S. 108 (2013)(expressing the presumption against 
extraterritoriality reflects the presumption that United States law 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
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governs domestically but does not rule the world)(internal citations 
omitted). The Jesner Court found this type of foreign policy 
consequence raises questions that should be left to political 
branches to decide. ODIN and the United States may agree that 
domestic corporations should not be hailed to foreign courts to 
answer their violations of international law but will argue that 
domestic corporations should have to answer those violations in 
the United States; or else the purpose of the ATS would be 
frustrated. See id. at 1406 (“The ATS was intended to promote 
harmony in international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a 
remedy for international-law violations in circumstances where 
the absence of such a remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold 
the United States accountable.”). 
ODIN and United States may also try to dispel the argument 
that the court should follow the holding made in the Second Circuit 
case Kiobel; “[f]or now, and for the foreseeable future, the Alien 
Tort Statute does not provide subject matter jurisdiction over 
claims against corporations.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). They 
may argue that the Second Circuit holding pertained to human 
rights violations and not transboundary pollution. Id. at 147 (“We 
hold that corporate liability is not a norm that we can recognize 
and apply in actions under the ATS because the customary 
international law of human rights does not impose any form of 
liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise).”). They may 
also argue that the Supreme Court only granted certiorari on the 
issue of extraterritoriality, and thus the question of corporate 
liability is left open by the Supreme Court. See Jesner at 1402. 
 
HexonGlobal 
 
HexonGlobal may argue that no corporation domestic, or 
foreign, is able to have a claim brought against them under the 
ATS. They will follow the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Kiobel 
that used the first part of the Sosa test to determine that the law 
of nations does not recognize “corporate liability.” HexonGlobal 
will argue that in this case the Sosa test must be applied to two 
questions: 1) Whether ‘corporate liability’ is a recognized “specific, 
universal, and obligatory” norm of international law?; and 
2)Whether the ‘Trail Smelter Principle’ is a recognized “specific, 
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universal, and obligatory” norm of international law? (The second 
question is addressed in Section III.B below). 
HexonGlobal may argue that the court must analyze 
‘corporate liability’ under the Sosa test by asserting that ATS was 
created with the understanding that the law of nations was “among 
civilized nations,” and therefore any party seeking to extend the 
notions of liability beyond liability to a civilized nation must 
“demonstrate that international law extends the scope of liability 
for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued.” See 
Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111, 146 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 569 U.S. 108, 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013)(“Customary international law arises from the 
customs and practices among civilized nations gradually ripening 
into a rule of international law. Accordingly, the responsibility lies 
with those who seek to demonstrate that international law extends 
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the 
perpetrator being sued.”)(internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
HexonGlobal will argue that corporate liability is not a 
specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international law. Even 
though the violations at issue in Kiobel were human rights 
violations, the court nonetheless asserted that there is no norm of 
any corporate liability in customary international law. See Id. (“In 
any event, although it is not our burden, we have little trouble 
demonstrating the absence of a norm of corporate liability in 
customary international law”). 
Even if analysis of “corporate liability” under Sosa’s first 
question is in doubt, HexonGlobal may argue that under Sosa’s 
second question the judiciary must defer to Congress. 
HexonGlobal would claim that extending liability to domestic 
corporations would implicate the same foreign-policy concerns that 
the Jesner Court dealt with, and that “[t]he political branches, not 
the Judiciary, have the responsibility and institutional capacity to 
weigh foreign-policy concerns.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 
(2018). 
B. Is the Trail Smelter Principle a recognized principle 
of customary international law enforceable as the “Law 
of Nations” under the ATS? 
ODIN and the United States argue that the Trail Smelter 
Principle is a recognized principle of customary international law 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
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as the “Law of Nations.” HexonGlobal argues that the Trail 
Smelter Principle is not a recognized principle of customary 
international law as the “Law of Nations.” 
Customary international law is the body of rules that nations 
in the international community universally abide by, or accede to, 
out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.” 44B Am. 
Jur. 2d International Law § 2. There are generally two components 
to customary international law: 1) the principle “should reflect 
wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the 
relevant activity,” and 2) “there must be a sense of legal 
obligation.” Id. 
 
ODIN and the United States 
 
ODIN and the United States may argue that the Trail 
Smelter Principle was confirmed as customary international law 
as far back as 1949 when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
decided the Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania). The 
ICJ “confirmed the customary nature of [the Trail Smelter 
Principle] . . . referring to the existence of ‘certain general and 
well- recognized principles, namely . . . every State’s obligation not 
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States.’” Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge E. Vinuales, 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 55-56 (Cambridge 
University Press 2015). ODIN and the United States may add 
that in 1996 the ICJ issued an advisory opinion that observed 
“[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the 
environment of the other States or of areas beyond national control 
is now a part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment.” Legality of the Treaty or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226, para. 29. (July 8). 
ODIN and the United States may also argue that the Trail 
Smelter Principle being adopted as Principle 21 of the Declaration 
of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, 
and reaffirmed as Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development concretely confirms the universal 
acceptance of this principle as customary international law. U.N. 
Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-16, 
1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
17
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Environment, 5, U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972); 
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 
1992, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1(VOL.I) (1992); 
see also Andrew Shoyer et al., Chapter 14: Carbon Leakage and the 
Migration of Private CO2 Emitters to Other Jurisdictions, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 
286, 375 (Cinnamon Carlarne et al. eds., Oxford University Press 
2016)(“Some of these principles have crystallized into customary 
international law, such as the ‘no harm rule’ laid down in the Trail 
Smelter case and embodied in Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration and Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration.”). ODIN and 
the United States will argue that clear language of the principle 
appearing in the UN declarations, the wide acceptance of these 
declarations, and the clear mandate set forth in the principle 
satisfy the “specific, universal, and obligatory” requirement of the 
first question of the Sosa test. They may add that even though the 
Declarations are not binding instruments of international law 
themselves, the Trail Smelter Principle’s broad acceptance is 
strong evidence of broad consensus of its obligatory nature. 
Finally ODIN and the United States may strengthen their 
argument that the Principle is universally endorsed by its repeated 
appearance in several binding international treaties: It appears as 
Article 3 of the Convention on Biological Diversity which was 
ratified by 196 countries; in the preamble to the UNFCCC which 
was ratified by 197 countries; and in the preamble to the 
Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly 
in Africa which was ratified by 193 countries. Convention on 
Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993); U.N. Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 3, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994); U.N. 
Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly 
in Africa, opened for signature Oct. 14-15, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3 
(entered into force Dec. 26, 1993). 
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HexonGlobal 
 
HexonGlobal may argue that the principle is not a norm that 
is “specific, universal, and obligatory” under the Sosa test. In Sosa 
the Court rejects Alvarez’ argument that “arbitrary arrests,” as 
defined by two well-known international agreements, are 
violations of customary international law. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734-37 
(2004) (“Alvarez cites two well-known international agreements 
that, despite their moral authority, have little utility under the 
standard set out in this opinion.”) HexonGlobal will argue that 
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and 1992 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, are analogous 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Alvarez relied 
on in Sosa and do not impose binding obligations. 
HexonGlobal may also argue that the Trail Smelter Principle 
is not applicable to greenhouse gas emissions, because the harms 
traditionally recognized by the Trail Smelter Principle are 
typically traceable to their source. See Roda Verheyen & Cathrin 
Zengerling, Chapter 19: International Dispute Settlement, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE LAW 417, 438 (Cinnamon Carlarne et al. eds., Oxford 
University Press 2016)(“However [the Trail Smelter Arbitration] 
involved one polluter, whereas climate change is multi- 
dimensional, which presents a much more complex interaction 
between cause and effect.”). 
C. Assuming the Trail Smelter Principle is customary 
international law, does it impose obligations 
enforceable against non-governmental actors? 
ODIN and the United States argue the Trail Smelter 
Principle, as customary international law, can impose obligations 
enforceable against non-governmental actors. HexonGlobal 
argue that the Trail Smelter Principle can only impose obligations 
on a nation state. 
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ODIN and the United States 
 
ODIN and the United States cannot easily deny that the 
Trail Smelter Principle has historically been understood to set 
obligations on governmental actors. However, they will argue that 
private parties nonetheless can directly be obligated to refrain 
from causing transboundary damage under international. 
ODIN and the United States will argue that the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration itself imposed obligations directly on the Trail 
Smelter. In its analysis, the Tribunal sought to answer the 
following question: “(2) In the event of the answer to the first part 
of the preceding question being in the affirmative, whether the 
Trail Smelter should be required to refrain from causing damage 
in the State of Washington in the future and, if so, to what extent?” 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. pp. 1905-82, p.1938 
(1941). Though the holding of the Tribunal sets unambiguous 
obligations on States, it directly answers the above question in 
reference to the conduct of the Trail Smelter. Id. at 1966. (“The 
Tribunal, therefore, answers Question No. 2 as follows: (2) So long 
as the present conditions in the Columbia River Valley prevail, the 
Trail Smelter shall be required to refrain from causing any damage 
through fumes in the State of Washington;”). Therefore, ODIN and 
the United States will argue that a proper reading of the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration imposes obligations on private parties to 
refrain from causing transboundary harm. 
Following this argument, they may argue that the ATS allows 
liability on any violation of the Trail Smelter Principle, regardless 
of the actor, because any party causing transboundary harm 
should be “required to refrain” from the harm they are causing on 
another State. This argument makes logical sense from a plain 
reading of the statute, because on its face the ATS does not limit 
defendants to a specific class, as discussed above in Section III.A. 
ODIN and the United States might also argue that the Trail 
Smelter Principle really has two aspects: The Trail Smelter 
Principle 1) imposes a State with a responsibility not to use or 
allow the use of its territory to harm other States, and 2) grants 
parties outside of that State a right to be free from transboundary 
harm. ODIN and the United States might argue that those two 
aspects have become equally enforceable norms under the law of 
nations. They would then argue that under the second aspect of the 
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Trial Smelter Principle an alien could seek to enforce a violation of 
its right to be free from transboundary harm, under the ATS. 
 
HexonGlobal 
 
HexonGlobal will argue that even if a domestic corporation 
can be a defendant under the ATS, and the Trail Smelter Principle 
is customary international law enforceable as the Law of Nations 
under the ATS, the Trail Smelter Principle is only ever enforceable 
against nation states (referred to as ‘States’ by principles of 
international law) and not non-governmental entities. In the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration an international arbitral panel held that 
harms to agriculture interests in the United States caused by air 
pollution emissions from a smelter in Canada were a violation of 
international liability principles: 
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in 
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of 
another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of 
serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. pp. 1905-82, p.1965 
(1941)(emphasis added). In the Corfu Channel Case and the 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ 
reaffirmed that the principle pertains only to States. Corfu 
Channel Case, Judgment on merits, 1949 I.C.J. 4, p. 22 (April 
9)(“Such obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 
1907, No. VTII, which is applicable in time of war, but on certain 
general . . . principles, namely . . . every State’s obligation not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States.”)(emphasis added); Legality of the Treaty or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226, para. 
29. (July 8)(“[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect 
the environment of the other States or of areas beyond national 
control is now a part of the corpus of international law relating to 
the environment.”)(emphasis added). 
HexonGlobal may add that the adopted language of the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment and reaffirmed 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development concretely 
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confirms the universal acceptance of this principle as customary 
international law also only implicate States: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction. 
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 5-
16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, 5, U.N. Doc A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 
1972); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-
14, 1992, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/REV.1(VOL.I) 
(1992). 
HexonGlobal may also argue that even if the Sosa test is 
applied only to the Trail Smelter Principle as ODIN and the 
United States suggest, the principle can only be considered a 
“universal[ly]” accepted norm when it applies to nation states, 
because it is not a normal practice to extend the obligations of the 
Trail Smelter Principle to corporations. 
Finally, HexonGlobal may argue that the obligations under 
Trail Smelter Principle can never be squared with corporate 
liability, because the principle is inseparably tied to the notion of 
sovereignty which is a notion that is wholly tied to governing. See 
Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. pp. 1905-82, pp.1962-65 
(1941). 
D. If otherwise enforceable, is the Trail Smelter 
Principle displaced by the Clean Air Act? 
The United States and HexonGlobal argue even if the Trail 
Smelter Principle is otherwise enforceable, it is nevertheless 
displaced by the Clean Air Act (CAA). ODIN argues the Trail 
Smelter Principle is not displaced by the CAA. 
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United States and HexonGlobal 
 
The United States and HexonGlobal will argue that the 
alleged tort claim under the ATS would be a federal common law 
claim pertaining to the emissions of greenhouse gases, and that 
these torts were directly displaced by the CAA. 
Claims sounding in international tort are considered one of the 
narrow areas of federal common law still in existence post Erie. See 
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729-32. However, the United States and 
HexonGlobal will assert that the Supreme Court held the Clean 
Air Act displaces the federal common law of air pollution. Am. Elec. 
Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011); See also City of Oakland 
v. B.P., PLC, No. C17-06011 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 25, 2018); City of New 
York v. B.P., PLC, No. 18 Civ. 182 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 19, 2018). 
In AEP the Supreme Court heard claims by “several States, 
the city of New York, and three private land trusts” asserting 
“federal common law public nuisance claims against carbon-
dioxide emitters.” Am. Elec. Power Co. 564 U.S. at 415. Similar to 
international tort claims, the AEP Court acknowledged that 
environmental protection is an area where the federal common law 
survives post-Erie. Id. at 421 (quoting Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 
U.S. 91, 103 (1972)(Milwaukee I): “When we deal with air and 
water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal 
common law.”). However, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
contention that a line of cases recognizing federal common law 
claims to abate pollution emanating from other States gave them 
a federal public nuisance claim. Id. Instead, the Court cited 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 305 (1981)(Milwaukee II) 
which held that the Clean Water Act displaced nuisance claims 
recognized in Milwaukee I. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 305 
(1981)(“when Congress addresses a question previously governed 
by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an 
unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.”). The 
AEP Court ruled that “[t]he test for whether congressional 
legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is 
simply whether the statute speaks directly to the question.” Am. 
Elec. Power Co. 564 U.S. at 424 (internal citations omitted). The 
AEP Court went on to hold: 
“the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any 
federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide 
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emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants. Massachusetts made 
plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air pollution 
subject to regulation under the Act. [Massachusetts v. EPA,] 549 
U.S. [497], 528-529, 127 S.Ct. 1438 [(2007)]. And we think it 
equally plain that the Act “speaks directly” to emissions of carbon 
dioxide from the defendants’ plants.” 
 
Id. The United and HexonGlobal will argue that the allegations 
made by ODIN are the same as the allegations made in AEP, and 
as such, are displaced by the CAA. 
 
ODIN 
 
ODIN will argue that the present case raises a claim that is 
distinguishable from the public nuisance claim in AEP. 
ODIN may argue that Clean Air Act does not “speak directly” 
to the question at issue. When considered broadly ODIN cannot 
deny that the Justice Ginsburg’s catalogue of the CAA’s and the 
EPA’s authority to regulate carbon emissions is sound; the CAA 
“speaks directly to emissions of carbon dioxide.” Id. However, 
ODIN could argue that CAA does not regulate air pollution for the 
purposes of protecting the citizens of A’Na Atu. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 
(“The purposes of this subchapter are. . .(1) to protect and enhance 
the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its 
population…”(emphasis added). Following this line of reasoning, 
ODIN would not argue that the CAA does not regulate carbon 
emissions, it does. They would argue that the CAA does not “speak 
directly” to the quality of A’Na Atu’s air resources so as to promote 
the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of A’Na 
Atu’s population, which ODIN would claim is painfully obvious 
from the fact that A’Na Atu’s existence is now in peril. 
Instead, ODIN would frame the question to include the 
specific issue of transboundary harm caused by carbon emissions: 
Does any act of Congress speak directly to the issue of carbon 
emission in United States effecting the public health and welfare 
of alien citizens? ODIN would argue there is no such act of 
Congress, and that this claim fits into the “small number of 
international norms that a federal court could properly recognize 
as within the common law enforceable without further statutory 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol10/iss1/2
  
38 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 10 
authority.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. ODIN may add that the ATS is 
the only avenue available for plaintiffs like Mana to have their 
harms addressed, and that the ATS was “intended to promote 
harmony in international relations by ensuring foreign plaintiffs a 
remedy for international-law violations where the absence of such 
a remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United States 
accountable.” Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1406 (2018). ODIN would argue 
that instead of intending to displace claims against transboundary 
harms from carbon emissions it was Congress’ intent to allow these 
types of claims to be available to injured aliens. 
Finally, ODIN may attempt to distinguish the Trail Smelter 
Principle from the CAA, and US environmental law in general, by 
arguing the Trail Smelter Principle’s tie to sovereignty takes the 
issue out of the hands of displacement analysis. See Juliana, 217 
F.Supp.3d at 1260 (“Public trust claims are unique because they 
concern inherent attributes of sovereignty. The public trust 
imposes on the government an obligation to protect the res of the 
trust. A defining feature of that obligation is that it cannot be 
legislated away, because of the nature of public trust claims, a 
displacement analysis simply does not apply.”) ODIN would 
analogize the sovereignty obligations under the public trust 
doctrine to the sovereignty obligations under the Trail Smelter 
Principle. This argument would require a flexible view of who is 
obligated not to infringe on the sovereignty of another country, as 
discussed above in Section III.C. 
 
IV. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: Is there a cause of action 
against the United States Government, based on the Fifth 
Amendment substantive due process protections for life, 
liberty, and property, for failure to protect the global 
atmospheric climate system from disruption due to the 
production, sale, and burning of fossil fuel? 
 
The United States and HexonGlobal argue the Fifth 
Amendment due process protections for life, liberty, and property, 
do not create a cause of action against the United States 
Government for failure to protect the global atmospheric climate 
system from disruption due to the production, sale, and burning of 
fossil fuels. ODIN argues there is a cause of action against the 
United States Government, based on the Fifth Amendment 
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substantive due process protections for life, liberty, and property, 
for failure to protect the global atmospheric climate system from 
disruption due to the production, sale, and burning of fossil fuels. 
 
The United States and HexonGlobal 
 
The United States and HexonGlobal will argue that there 
is no fundamental right to “a healthy and stable climate system” 
entitling Flood to a cause of action under the Fifth Amendment. 
They may argue that the states, not the federal government, have 
public trust obligations; that public trust doctrine does not include 
the atmosphere as a public trust asset; and that even if federal 
public trust claims exist, they are federal common-law claims, and 
displaced by acts of Congress. The United States and 
HexonGlobal will further argue that even if the US government 
has a duty not to directly cause atmospheric greenhouse gases to 
reach a level so as to endanger the heath and stability of the 
climate, the Due Process Clause does not impose on the US 
government an affirmative duty to prevent private parties from 
endangering the climate. 
The United States and HexonGlobal may argue that the 
public trust doctrine only applies to the states. Asserting this, they 
will rely on the Supreme Court case PPL Montana, LLC v. 
Montana. In PPL Montana the Court declares that “Unlike the 
equal-footing doctrine, however, which is the constitutional 
foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title, the public 
trust doctrine remains a matter of state law,” and that “the 
contours of [the] public trust do not depend upon the Constitution.” 
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603, 604 (2012). The 
defendants may bolster this argument by citing the D.C. District 
Court case Alec L. v. Jackson which affirms the PPL Montana 
statement as binding and forecloses the possibility of a federal 
public trust claim. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 15 
(D.D.C. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 
F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(“The Supreme Court’s recent decision 
in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, appears to have foreclosed this 
argument.”) 
The United States and HexonGlobal may also argue that 
the atmosphere is not a recognized asset protected under the public 
trust doctrine. They will argue that, even if public trust doctrine 
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can be extended to federal claims, that “no cases . . . have expanded 
the doctrine to protect the atmosphereFalse” Alec L. 863 F. Supp. 
2d at 13. They may argue further that the public trust doctrine 
“has traditionally been understood, [to apply] only to a specific and 
limited set of natural resources within a government’s 
jurisdiction—most specifically, lands submerged beneath tidal and 
navigable waterways—and serves only to restrict the government’s 
ability to transfer title in those resources or otherwise alienate 
them.” Memorandum in Support of Intervenor-Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss at 10, Juliana v. United States, 2015 WL 7587592 
(D.Or.) (citing United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 407 
(1903); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 445-453 (1892).) 
Following this argument, they will try to distinguish the 
atmosphere from traditionally recognized public trust assets by 
arguing that the atmosphere is not a resource that can be 
transferred or alienated, and as such, is wholly outside the scope 
of the public trust doctrine. 
Even if a federal public trust claim, including the atmosphere 
as an asset, exists, the United States and HexonGlobal may 
argue that the claim is displaced by the Clean Air Act. See above 
section III.D. 
Finally, the United States and HexonGlobal will argue that 
even if the public trust doctrine imbeds into the constitution a 
fundamental right to “a healthy and stable climate system,” the US 
government is not required to prevent private parties from 
endangering the climate. If such a fundamental right exists, the 
Defendants may emphasize that “failure to protect the global 
atmospheric climate system from disruption due to the production, 
sale, and burning of fossil fuels,” is wholly outside of the realm of 
protections provided by the Due Process Clause. The Supreme 
Court has specifically rejected any fundamental Due Process right 
to government protection from allegedly wrongful acts by private 
parties. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 196 (1989). 
The Defendants may argue that this court should follow the 
Circuits that have refused to adopt the danger-exception like the 
First Circuit. See Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc, 961 
F.2d 987, 990–91 (1st Cir. 1992), as amended (Apr. 17, 1992), as 
amended (May 8, 1992) (“It follows from DeShaney that Monahan 
has failed to state a viable claim for denial of substantive due 
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process. Even if some or all of the defendants were found to have 
acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to Monahan’s needs in failing 
properly to treat and manage him, so as to render him vulnerable 
to being hit by a car, their misconduct violated no constitutional 
duty. Monahan’s remedies, like those of most others in similar 
situations, lie in the arena of tort, not constitutional law.”). The 
Monahan court argued that the government actions, may well give 
rise tort claims, but not constitutional violations, because “they did 
not involve the affirmative exercise of government power required 
to make out a constitutional violation.” Id. at 994. Here, the 
Defendants will not argue that the claims ODIN presents are torts 
but the Defendants will agree with the Monahan court that a due 
process violation requires an “affirmative exercise of government 
power.” 
The Defendants may also argue that the “danger creation” 
exception ODIN relies on is not applicable. They may argue that 
the danger exception only applies when a government body “has 
control over a particular individual’s person and places him or her 
in imminent peril.” See, e.g., Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 
115 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a cause of action for 
due process violation arose where officers “took affirmative actions 
that significantly increased the risk facing Penilla: they cancelled 
the 9-1-1 call to the paramedics; they dragged Penilla from his 
porch, where he was in public view, into an empty house; then they 
locked the door and left him there alone . . . after they had 
examined him and found him to be in serious medical need”); Wood 
v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1989) (due process cause 
of action arose where officer arrested a female driver, impounded 
the car, and left driver by the side of the road at night in a high-
crime area). They would distinguish the particular, imminent, and 
personal harms historically recognized under the danger exception 
from the broad, historic, and global harms alleged here. 
The Defendants may also argue that if the exception applies, 
the three requirements of the exception are not met. They would 
argue that 1) many parties’ actions across the globe, not just the 
US government’s actions, created the dangers complained of; 2) 
majority of government actions complained of long predated any 
awareness of the potential dangers of human induced climate 
change; 3) the fact that US government has joined the UNFCCC, 
enacted the CAA, and made findings of endangerment dispels any 
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broad claim that the US has historically acted with deliberate 
indifference to climate change. 
 
ODIN 
 
ODIN asserts Flood claims a fundamental due process right 
to a healthy and stable climate system and seeks to support this 
right by relying on public trust principles. ODIN will argue the 
property rights protected by the public trust doctrine are secured 
by the Constitution as fundamental rights. Under the public trust 
doctrine, ODIN asserts the global climate system is a common 
property owned in trust by the United States that must be 
protected and administered for the benefit of current and future 
generations. ODIN will argue that, though these property rights 
are unenumerated, the rights are nonetheless fundamental rights 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
ODIN will argue further that the fundamental right to a healthy 
and stable climate system confers on the US Government the 
obligation to protect the global atmospheric climate system from 
disruption due to the production, sale, and burning of fossil fuels. 
Finally, ODIN will argue that any “victim[] of a constitution 
violation by a federal agent [has] a right to recover damages 
against the official in federal court despite the absence of any 
statute conferring such a right.” Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 
(1980). 
ODIN will argue that the fundamental right to a healthy and 
stable climate system was an inalienable right held by every 
citizen prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and that the 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause was the 
vehicle by which the founding fathers secured the right. Since the 
fundamental right of “a healthy and stable climate system” is not 
enumerated in the Constitution, ODIN will provide the court with 
evidence that the right is (1) “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition” or (2) “fundamental to our scheme of ordered 
liberty.” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010). 
ODIN may argue that the public trust doctrine is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ by way of the common 
law passed to us through Great Britain and the ancient Romans 
from natural law. The ancient Roman Code of Justinian declared 
“the following things are by natural law common to all - the air, 
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running water, the sea, and consequently the seashore.” J. Inst. 
2.1.1 (J.B. Moyle trans.). This declaration developed into the 
“fundamental understanding that no government can legitimately 
abdicate its core sovereign powers.” Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 
1254. In other words, a government holds its powers of sovereignty 
in trust for future generations, and as trustee has an obligation not 
to give any of these powers away. In holding that the State of 
Illinois could not give up its title to lands submerged beneath 
navigable waters, the Supreme Court announced that “[t]he state 
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested. . .than it can abdicate its police powers in 
the administration of government and the preservation of peace.” 
Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 
(1892). ODIN may also argue that in addition to the deep roots of 
the public trust doctrine in our Nation’s history and tradition, that 
a healthy and stable climate is “fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty,” because underlying the concepts of life, liberty 
and property is a precondition of a healthy and stable climate. 
ODIN may specifically argue that the atmosphere is held in 
the public trust assets by citing that the ancient Romans included 
“the air” in the assets common to all. ODIN may also set the issue 
of the atmosphere as an asset itself aside, and argue, as the 
Juliana court did, that the public trust doctrine is implicated 
through the alleged harms to the territorial sea. Juliana, 217 
F.Supp.3d at 1255. (“I conclude that it is not necessary at this stage 
to determine whether the atmosphere is a public trust asset 
because plaintiffs have alleged violations of the public trust 
doctrine in connection with the territorial sea.”). ODIN would 
argue that even if the atmosphere is not a recognized public trust 
asset, a healthy and stable climate system is affected by violations 
of the public trust doctrine in connection with the territorial sea. 
ODIN alleged violations of the public trust doctrine in connection 
with the territorial sea, such as a reduction of the availability of 
locally caught sea food source from “the climate change induced 
ocean acidification, warming, and loss of coastal wetlands[.]” Since 
the territorial sea is a part of a healthy and stable climate the Due 
Process claim would still be valid. 
Beyond tracing the public trust back to the natural law by way 
of Great Britain and ancient Rome, ODIN may bolster their 
argument by asserting that the fundamental right of a healthy and 
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stable climate system is a “necessary condition to exercising other 
rights to life, liberty, and property.” Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 
1250 (D. Or. 2016). As the court in Juliana reasoned, this 
argument could be bolstered by following the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning when it recognized that the right to same-sex marriage 
is necessary in enforcing the right to privacy. Id.; See Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015)(“[I]t would be contradictory to 
recognize a right to privacy with respect to other matters of family 
life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship 
that is at the foundation of the family our society.”). The Juliana 
court reasoned that “[j]ust as marriage is the foundation of the 
family, a stable climate system is quite literally the foundation of 
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor 
progress.” Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1250 (D. Or. 2016)(citation 
and quotation marks omitted). 
Once ODIN has established that the public trust doctrine 
creates a fundamental right to a healthy and stable climate, they 
will argue that the Due Process Clause confers on the US 
Government the obligation to protect the global atmospheric 
climate system from disruption due to the production, sale, and 
burning of fossil fuels. While the Supreme Court has specifically 
rejected any fundamental Due Process right to government 
protection from allegedly wrongful acts by private parties, ODIN 
will argue the “danger creation” exception to DeShaney applies and 
imposes the obligation. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (1989); Juliana, 
217 F.Supp.3d at 1251 (D. Or. 2016). 
Following the three prong test the Juliana court created to 
clarify the exception, ODIN will make the following arguments: (1) 
the government’s acts, such as tax subsidies for fossil fuel 
production, leasing of public lands and seas under its jurisdiction 
for coal, oil, and gas production, creation of the interstate highway 
system, and the development of fossil fuel power plants by public 
agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, etc. created a 
danger to the Mr. Flood; (2) the US government has formally 
acknowledged the existence of the dangers of climate change since 
1992 when it signed and ratified the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change; and (3) despite the government’s 
formal acknowledgement of the harms of climate change, the 
government’s nominal and largely ineffective actions, together 
with the current administration’s efforts to reverse those actions, 
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amount to deliberate indifference. ODIN may add that, while the 
Defendants may point to cases of particular, imminent, and 
personal harms, no case in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence 
specifically limits the danger exception to those types of claims. See 
Id. at 1252. 
Finally, ODIN will conclude that the failure to protect the 
global atmospheric climate system from disruption due to the 
production, sale, and burning of fossil fuels amounted to a failure 
to protect Flood’s fundamental right to a healthy and stable 
climate system, which is a violation of the Due Process clause of 
the Constitution, and as such, grants Flood a cause of action in 
federal court. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767. 
 
V. POLITICAL QUESTION: Do Plaintiffs’ law of nations 
claim under the Alien Tort Statute and public trust claim 
present a non-justiciable political question? 
 
ODIN and HexonGlobal argue the law of nations claim 
under the Alien Tort Statute and public trust claim do not present 
a non-justiciable political question. The United States argues the 
law of nations claim under the Alien Tort Statute and public trust 
claim present non-justiciable political questions. 
A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide a 
political question: “Questions, in their nature political, or which 
are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can 
never be made in this court.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 
(1803). In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court 
provides six factors which help to identify a political question. 
Unless the question presented by the case at bar is “inextricable” 
from any of the Baker factors “there should be no dismissal for non-
justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence.” 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). Analysis under the Baker 
factors should also be considered with the understanding that the 
factors “‘often collapse[e] into one another,’” and that the “‘common 
underlying inquiry’ is whether ‘the question is one that can 
properly be decided by the judiciary.’” Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 
1236 (quoting Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
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ODIN and HexonGlobal 
 
ODIN and HexonGlobal argue that these claims present 
questions that can properly be decided by the judiciary. 
 
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department 
 
ODIN and HexonGlobal will argue that nothing in the text 
of the Constitution commits the issue of environmental policy, 
including atmospheric emissions and transboundary 
environmental harm, to a coordinate political department. The 
Constitution did not delegate a single branch of government 
exclusive power over climate change issues. See Juliana, 217 
F.Supp.3d at 1237. 
ODIN and HexonGlobal may try to dispel the notion that 
climate change policy is inextricably connected to foreign relations 
which is traditionally understood to be textually committed to the 
Executive Branch. They may assert, that while “climate change 
policy has global implications,” it “is not inherently, or even 
primarily, a foreign policy decision.” Id. at 1238. Even if the 
United States argues that claims under the ATS clearly 
implicates foreign policy, the Baker Court warned that “it is error 
to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign 
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. 
ODIN and HexonGlobal may add that ATS specifically grants 
jurisdiction to the federal courts, so the mere fact that a claim 
under the ATS implicates questions of foreign policy would not 
render the question non- justiciable. 
 
(2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it, and (3) the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion 
 
“The second and third Baker factors reflect circumstances in 
which a dispute calls for decision making beyond courts’ 
competence.” Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 
203 (2012)(Sotomayor, J., concurring). ODIN and HexonGlobal 
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will argue that the second and third Baker factors are not 
applicable here, because both the Trail Smelter Principle and the 
public trust doctrine have judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards. 
Whether or not to recognize the Trail Smelter Principle under 
the ATS and whether the public trust doctrine applies to climate 
change are complex questions that require the court to consider a 
complex set of legal standards, but ODIN and HexonGlobal will 
argue that the legal framework, as complicated as it may be, is 
there for the court to make a determination. They may add that 
even though these claims are not bound up in statutory or 
regulatory provisions that a court would typically use to resolve an 
environmental claim, constitutional law and international law 
nonetheless have manageable standards which courts apply to new 
sets of facts every day. Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 1239. 
 
(4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government, (5) an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made, and (6) the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question 
 
The fourth through sixth Baker factors “address 
circumstances in which prudence may counsel a court’s resolution 
of an issue presented.” Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 204 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring). 
Regarding the Trail Smelter Principle under the ATS, ODIN 
and HexonGlobal will argue the political branches have not made 
political decisions in this area, and that there is no possibility of a 
court expressing a lack of respect or causing embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements on this particular topic. 
With respect to a public trust based fundamental right to a 
healthy and stable environment, ODIN and HexonGlobal will 
argue that the constitutional analysis of Mr. Flood’s due process 
rights is a wholly different issue than the political branches’ 
disposition on climate change. While it may be argued that 
President Trump’s pronouncements on climate change policy have 
the potential to cause embarrassment and inconsistencies 
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throughout various departments on what will be done about 
climate change, ODIN and HexonGlobal will argue that whether 
a fundamental right exists and is protected by the Constitution is 
properly decided by the judiciary. 
 
United States 
 
The United States will argue the nation was founded with a 
keen objective to separate the powers of government in order to 
defend against tyranny. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756-
757 (1996)(“[I]t remains a basic principle of our constitutional 
scheme that one branch of the Government may not intrude upon 
the central prerogatives of another.”). Broadly, the United States 
will argue that the powers left to Congress and Executive Branch 
would be intruded upon if these questions were decided by the 
court. 
 
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department 
 
The United States will argue that climate change is 
inherently a foreign relations issue, and that the foreign policy 
implications presented by each of the questions presented by these 
claims should be left to the Executive Branch to answer. The 
United States may cite several sources from the Constitution, and 
cases interpreting the Constitution, to establish that foreign 
relations is textually demonstrable to be inextricably committed to 
the Executive Branch. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“shall have 
Power . . . to make Treaties, . . . shall nominate . . . 
Ambassadors . . . .”); See also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 
135 S.Ct. 2076, 2084-86 (2015). 
The United States may argue that the foreign relations 
aspect of climate change policy, is particularly relevant to the 
analysis of the questions presented under the ATS. In Sosa and 
Jesner the Supreme Court has announced its caution in 
recognizing new private rights of action. See Sosa, 542 U.S at 727 
(“[T]his Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision to 
create a private right of action is one better left to legislative 
judgment in the great majority of cases”); Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1402 
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(“the Legislature is in a better position to consider if the public 
interest would be served by imposing a new substantive legal 
liability”)(quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S.__,__, 137 S.Ct. 
1843,1857 (2017)). By recognizing a new private right for an alien 
to sue a domestic corporation for international tort the court would 
be infringing on a determination better left to Congress. 
Regarding the public trust claim, the United States might 
also cite the Constitution text to assert that “Congress has power 
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations regarding 
federal land. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The United States 
might argue this prevents the judiciary from recognizing new 
obligations related to federal land. 
 
(2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it, and 
(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion 
 
The United States will also argue that the court would have 
insufficient standards to resolve these questions without making 
an initial policy determination “about how to weigh competing 
economic and environmental concerns.” Juliana, 217 F.Supp.3d at 
1238. The United States will argue that the levels of carbon 
emissions that would provide a citizen with a healthy and stable 
climate system cannot be determined by the existing law or legal 
framework, and that a court should not be the entity to decide. 
 
(4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government, (5) an 
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made, and (6) the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by 
various departments on one question 
 
Finally, the United States may argue that President Trump’s 
clear policy stance to leave the Paris Agreement, and denounce the 
notion of international responsibility to reduce carbon, would be 
undermined and not given its proper respect if a court recognized 
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an alien’s ATS claim under the Trail Smelter Principle. The 
United States might also argue these foreign relations questions 
would cause embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements on 
this issue specifically, and on climate change policy generally. 
 
This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the 
problem, merely an indicative list of issues to be discussed in teams’ 
written submissions and oral arguments. One should appreciate 
reasoned and reasonable creativity and ideas beyond those in this 
limited analysis. 
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